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CASE COMMENTS
Civil Rights-Application of Judicial Immunity and
Volenti Non Fit Injuria
Ps sought damages for their detention in the Jackson, Mississippi
jail under the common law tort of false imprisonment and also
initiated a civil action for deprivation of rights granted by the
federal Civil Rights Acts. They were civil rights workers on a
"prayer pilgrimage." When they attempted to enter a segregated
bus terminal restaurant, they were halted by police officers and
were arrested when they refused to disburse. There was evidence
indicating that the purpose of their trip was to challenge the
segregation policy of the restaurant, and that in doing so, they contemplated being arrested. Ds were the arresting officers and the
police justice before whom Ps were tried and convicted. A jury
trial in the Southern District of Mississippi resulted in a verdict
for Ds and Ps appealed. Held, reversed. The police justice and
the policemen are immune from suit for false arrest. The police
justice is immune from suit under the federal act. The cause
against the officers was remanded to the district court for a factual
determination of whether the Ps had "a plan and purpose of being
arrested". Such a showing would preclude Ps" recovery under the
federal act. Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).
The subject of this note is the court's application of the doctrines
of judicial immunity and volenti non fit injuria to the federal
cause of action. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1959). The act provides that
anyone who under color of state law deprives a citizen of any
civil right shall be liable to the injured party. The civil rights act
creates a right of recovery which is analogous to a tort action, but
the act does not indicate whether defenses or immunities applicable
to similar tort action apply to suits under it.
In cases where legislative gaps appear, such as this one, the
courts essentially legislate by applying the law they think best
suited to the statute. WBIGHT, FMmiAL Coutrs § 60 (1963).
The courts have not been consistent as to the sources of the law
they apply in a particular case. In general, they apply either the
general principles of the common law or "federal" law which is
derived from the intent of Congress or the federal policy they
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wish to enact by the law. No clear basis has emerged which would
assist in determining when general common law or federal law
should be applied. The principal guide the courts have chosen is
the furtherance of the federal policy the Congress intended to
effectuate. The courts have chosen to apply state law to the
statute when it appears that the federal policy would be better
achieved by doing so or where the statute implies that state law
should govern. IA MooRE, FEDmur Prtcrice ff 10. 323 [22] (2d.
ed. 1965).
The first problem, whether judicial immunity should have been
applied, might have been resolved differently by the court in the
principal case had federal law been chosen. The question of immunity often has arisen under the statute, and although the circuit
and district courts are split, the question has never been decided
in the United States Supreme Court. A leading case denying
judicial immunity from suits brought under the statute is Picking
v. PennsylvaniaRR. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945). In support
of denying this immunity, the court in the Picking case cited Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942). The court stated
at 176,
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation
... are.., federal questions, the answers to which are to be
derived from the statute and the federal policy which is
adopted. To the federal statute and policy conflicting state
law and policy must yield.
The Third Circuit court felt that a state grant of judicial immunity
should yield to the federal policy of compensating individuals
for state actions, or for colorably state authorized actions which
deprived them of their civil rights. Professor Moore agrees with
this case. 1A Mooim, FEDmiAr PRACIICE jf 0.323 [3] (2d ed. 1965).
The vast majority of decisions on this question grants judicial or
quasi-judicial officers immunity from suit under the statute. The
grounds for this holding are usually: (1) the prevalence of the
doctrine of judicial immunity from tort actions in the federal courts,
Gateway v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1962); or (2) the
interest in keeping judges free to act without worries of civil
liability, Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1957); or (3)
an application of United States Supreme Court cases granting im-
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munity, Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1953); or (4)
some combination of the three, as in the principal case. The
Supreme Court case cited as overruling Pickway is Tenney v. Brandhoye, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) which holds legislators immune from
prosecution under the statute. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1960) holds municipal corporations immune.
The second problem presented by the principal case, whether
volenti non fit injuria should be applied, involves a similar question.
Should the general common law of torts be applied to the statute,
or should the courts look to the federal policy Congress intended
the statute to serve? In the principal case, which appears to be the
first case discussing the application of consent to the statute, the
law applied was the "governing common law rules" of Mississippi.
It appears that a plan and purpose of being arrested would prohibit recovery for false imprisonment under the general law. Pinossm, ToRTs § 102 (3d ed. 1964).
A more difficult question is whether the court in the principal
case properly interpreted the intent of Congress. In Monroe v.
Pape, supra the purposes for which the act was passed were carefully analyzed. Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, felt
that a chief purpose was to supply a federal remedy where the
peculiar situation in a state prevented a citizen from obtaining
redress for the civil right which was taken from him. Justice
Frankfurter felt the liability was created where redress would
be barred by a statute, custom or usage which sanctioned the actions
of those who deprived a citizen of civil rights.
Is the federal interest in protecting a citizen from deprivation of
his civil rights strong enough to override the principle of volenti
non fit injuria, as applied to common law tort actions? Did
Congress intend for a person deprived for a civil right to recover
even though he consented to that deprivation? These questions
were not answered or apparently even considered by the court in
the principal case. The opinion states simply that as (1) the act
is to be read against the background of tort liability, and that (2)
the source of the background in this case is the law of Mississippi.
Thus, according to Mississippi law volenti non fit injuria applies
to this case.
The weakness of this reasoning apparently is evident to the Fifth
Circuit court. In a footnote to statement number (2) the court
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in the principal case admits that questions as to liability under
the statute are to be determined by federal law. Instead of taking
this course, the court, citing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape, supra, decided that the general background of tort
liability should be the source of the law applied. When that law
is found in state decisions, the footnoted rule is in effect reversed
as state law becomes controlling.
The decision that judicial immunity and volenti non fit injuria apply to the federal acts will probably not have severe consequences. It is difficult to imagine a person consenting to a
deprivation of his civil rights other than in a factual situation
similar to the one in the principal case. However, the method
the court used in arriving at the decision concerning the defense of
consent does establish a questionable precedent. In applying a
federal statute specifically enacted to override state law, it seems
very strange that the court should look to state law.
ForrestHansburyRoles

Constitutional Law-Apportionment of Constitutional Conventions
The Governor of West Virginia sought a writ of mandamus in
the state's Supreme Court of Appeals to require the Commissioner
of Finance and Administration to affix his signature to certain
contracts for publishing notices of a special public election on the
question of calling a convention to alter the state's constitution.
Held, writ denied. The statute setting up the method by which
delegates to the convention would be chosen and under which
the expenditure of funds would be made was unconstitutional in
that it violated the state's constitutional provision regulating apportionments of representation. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143
S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1965).
The principal case was decided on the basis of the applicability
of article II, section 4, of the West Virginia Constitution to the
apportionment of a constitutional convention. The constitution provides: "Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in
government, and, in all apportionments of representation, equality
of numbers of those entitled thereto, shall, as far as practicable,
be preserved." It was not necessary for the court to consider the
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